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word managers are really important. You don't want that to be
broken into, but you want someone to be able to access your
passwords. Using hardware keys is important. Don't knock the
centralized exchanges, like Coinbase and Kraken. Those ex-
changes have built-in ways to pass on your account to some-
body else. So for someone who wants to invest in cryptocur-
rencies but is not digitally savvy, that's a perfectly valid solu-
tion. Ledger is probably the hardware wallet of choice, and
then a Liberty Safe and good old pen and paper does wonders.
For some of my clients, they write down with a pen and paper
what their private keys are, all of their passwords, etc., they put
it in an old-school safe that only they have the combination
to, knowing that when they die their personal representative
will have to go to court, they will have to be named personal
representative by the court, and at that time, they will hire a
locksmith to come and break that safe open. So that's what
some of my crypto elite clients are doing.
SETH ORANBURG: Thank you, Carly.
CARLY HOwARD: That will wrap it up. Thanks, Seth.
SETH ORANBURG: Yes, marrying the high tech and the low
tech, that's practical right there, and so absolutely great ad-
vice. You definitely need to have a plan because if you forget
that private key, that Bitcoin disappears. People have lost mil-
lions by losing just a 64-bit number.
CARLY HOwARD: Yeah, and I think we're going to see more
of that too as people start passing away and then their repre-
sentatives can't find their keys.
SETH ORANBURG: Right. I can't even find my car keys, so, I
mean, this is going to happen certainly.
PRESENTATION 3: ANGELA WALCH-BLOCKCHAIN EMERGENCIES
& OPEN-SOURCE SOFTwARE GOVERNANCE: IS
"ROUGH CONSENSUS" A SUICIDE PACT?
SETH ORANBURG: So, next we have Professor Angela
Walch. I would love to hear from you about software and gov-
ernance and how blockchain fits into that as well. So please
take it away, Angela.
ANGELA WALCH: Hi. Thank you so much for having me
today. I've enjoyed these earlier presentations. Again, my
name is Angela Walch, and I'm a professor at St. Mary's Uni-
versity School of Law in San Antonio and a research associate
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at the UCL Centre for Blockchain Technologies. It's great to
be with everyone here today. A lot of this stuff that we have
heard discussed ties in with what I am thinking about. My talk
is probably a little bit less heavy on the legal intricacies and
more on thinking about how lawyers need to be concerned
about mechanics that underlie these systems and the "who is
doing what" at the base level of these systems.
So my talk here today is called Blockchain Emergencies
and Open-Source Software Governance: Is "Rough Consen-
sus" a Suicide Pact? I am fascinated by worst case scenarios,
and so that's what you're going to get today. Basically, how
we're going to proceed in this talk is to situate ourselves with
what I'm referring to here. I am concerned with the govern-
ance of these protocols at the base level. I'm concerned with,
"How is Bitcoin run? Who gets to make decisions about
Bitcoin? How is Ethereum run? Who gets to make decisions
about Ethereum?" Why does this matter? Well, it matters be-
cause-I think we've already heard a great demonstration of
why it matters-these protocols at the base are supporting this
whole DeFi structure that Aaron was discussing earlier, right?
All the complexities and different complex financial products
that are being built there, they sit on top of these infrastruc-
tural base level protocols. I think we need to be aware of how
these things work and the systemic risks that they can pose if
we're not really pressing on assumptions and practices in those
areas.
So I will talk about what the normal protocol governance
looks like in some of these systems, of course keeping in mind
that every one is slightly different. I'll talk about how their gov-
ernance might differ in emergencies in the systems, and then
post some open questions that I think we need to come up
with answers to so that the systems we're building atop of the
base level are reliable if we're putting big financial systems on
top of that.
This was the best picture I could come up with to just kind
of show you what I'm thinking about. I wish that it were actu-
ally the other way around, that you would have the thin layer
at the bottom and go up into this bigger triangle at the top.
But basically, I'm concerned with what's happening at the bot-
tom of a structure. When things go wrong at the bottom, at the
foundations, that can then make things on top of it fall apart,
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for instance the decentralized finance infrastructure. So I'm
thinking about the very bottom level.
We've heard discussion today about how the systems are
decentralized and there's been a lot of writing about how
power is shared across the system and there are lots of checks
and balances involved so that no one can really force anyone
to do anything. So we have software developers who are in-
volved in writing software and maintaining it, looking for bugs,
and helping to figure out what upgrades would be helpful to
the system and socializing those with the larger community
and ultimately proposing those to be adopted. You have peo-
ple who are running the software in these systems, the nodes
in the system, who do not have to run anything that they don't
want to run. We've heard also that the code that runs Bitcoin,
Ethereum, most of these crypto systems, I would guess all of
them-although Aaron noted that there's some new develop-
ments in that area-the code is open source. So the idea is
that everyone can read the code, they can decide if they want
to do a proposed upgrade or not. It's on them, it's their
choice, so checks and balances, the developers don't have ulti-
mate power. Same with the mining pools and the miners who
are in these networks-the ones that bundle up the transac-
tions and add them to the common ledger that everyone is
keeping.
So there's been talk about how, well, look, this is actually a
lot like constitutional systems like we have, like in the US. You
have different parties who are active in the governance system
and power is not absolute in any one of those settings. So here
on the screen, you're wondering what I'm talking about of
"BIPs" and "EIPs." This is the standard way that changes to the
software are made in, for instance, Bitcoin and Ethereum. So
we have a BIP, which is a Bitcoin Improvement Proposal, and
an EIP, Ethereum Improvement Proposal, that anyone can
make if they have a suggestion for how the software of the sys-
tems should change. It's important to remember that software
is how the systems run-it implements the governance.
Software implements the policy choices that people make and
that they then reflect in the code that is run on the system.
So there are processes within this open-source software
development context that are used in standard situations. Pro-
posals are made, there's a lot of vetting of these proposals by
other developers in the system as to whether they are techni-
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Business
NYU IOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS
cally sound, they might be a good idea, there's a lot of commu-
nity discussion about them. Then we go from here to more
community discussion. Finally, once there's enough commu-
nity discussion and the [developers ("devs")] are comfortable
with it, they say they've reached kind of "rough consensus" on
whether this upgrade is a good idea and the devs will finalize
that new software release and push it out to the network for
people to choose whether they want to run it or not. So the
nodes and the miners don't have to run it-as I said, they get
to choose-and the outcome is that either the network will
fork or it will stay together. So that's the typical process of
software governance. People generally say checks and bal-
ances, it's a pretty decentralized system.
So in theory, in non-crisis times, power is decentralized,
right? These things that I just said here: checks and balances,
no one can force anyone to upgrade, the code is transparent
(anyone can look at it and decide for themselves whether they
want to run it, and you don't have to upgrade if you decide
you don't want to), and if it's a type of software upgrade that
would not allow you to stay with the existing blockchain, you
can fork, right? You can go on your own and you don't have to
be governed by the new proposal. So this is the theory for
non-crisis times.
There are also crisis times, and these are the ones I'm re-
ally interested in. I like this picture because it was called the
apocalypse or something in the database I found the pictures
on. So, blockchain emergencies, what are these? They are
events that happen such as a bug in the code, a flaw that's
discovered perhaps in the cryptographic proofs that help to
support the blockchain's operation and they can bring down
the system if people exploit them. And we have had a number
of blockchain emergencies that have occurred in major
blockchains over time.
Just a few examples of these. We saw in Bitcoin, in the fall
of 2018, an inflation bug that if exploited could have blown
past the famed 21 million limit on Bitcoin. People discovered
it in time and worked to fix it. So don't worry. As far as I know,
the 21 million cap is still safe. But it was a critical bug in the
software. Similarly, we saw in Zcash, another more private
crypto system, that there was a flaw in the cryptographic proof
that if exploited, again, could have essentially broken the sys-
tem, made it uncredible and made it lose all its value. This was
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revealed by the Electronic Coin Company-the people who
had discovered this flaw and managed its resolution. They re-
vealed that in 2019.
What's different in these emergencies when these events
come up? Well, the normal standard governance processes
that I talked about go out the window. Remember, trans-
parency is a big deal in these, socializing with the community,
taking time to review, people understanding what they're get-
ting into. All of that goes out the window in emergency situa-
tions. In each of these situations-you can go and read the
bug reports, and there's lots of very interesting discussion put
out by the people who are involved in resolving these issues-
only a few people were told about the flaw or the emergency.
They determined the severity of the issue and how to handle
it. They didn't tell the public the truth about the situation un-
til later on when they were sure that the situation had been
fixed by people upgrading their software already. So the fix
was kind of hidden in the name of saving the blockchain. Key
mining pool operators were told to upgrade first, again, to
save the network.
So I know I'm coming probably close to the end of my
time. I think we really need to think about these situations
given the billions and billions, if not now soon to be trillions of
dollars in value riding on these systems, on these base level
protocols. What's a blockchain emergency? How do we know
when we're entering into this state of exception and go
outside our standard governance practices? Who gets to de-
cide? How much has to be at stake? Is it enough for people to
lose money? Is it that the core principles of the system, like the
cap of 21 million, is at stake here? Who decides what is an
emergency? What practices are okay in a state of emergency
that are not okay in normal times? Can you forego this critical,
crucial tenet of transparency in order to save the system? Who
needs to be informed about the problem? Who needs the
truth about the problem? And what obligations do those who
are running these emergency protocols owe to users and the
public? So, if you are familiar with any of the discourse around
states of emergency and the discussion around US constitu-
tional law, when do we suspend our normal practices and
who's the boss then? Very analogous . . ..
SETH ORANBURG: I think we may have frozen on you, An-
gela. What a cliffhanger. I think Angela might have frozen just
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as she was wrapping up, so we'll allow her a minute to respond
at the end of our panel. Sorry about that technical issue. But
quite an interesting presentation and really reminds me of
that miniseries, Chernobyl, where they just didn't want to talk
about what was happening at the nuclear power plant and that
led to a further disaster and creating the wrong incentives. I
love to think about incentives.
PRESENTATION 4: ZACH SMOLINSKI-SMART CONTRACTS
SETH ORANBURG: Let's now hear from Attorney Zach
Smolinski. He's going to talk to us about smart contracts and
practices in this area. Also a registered patent attorney. Zach, if
you would please, we'd love to hear your thoughts on the im-
pact of blockchain.
ZACH SMOLINSKI: Thank you, Seth, and thank you also to Isa-
bella for your work in organizing this event and also to the
NYU Journal of Law & Business and to the Classical Liberal
Institute for hosting today. I'm going to take a little different
approach. I'm not going to refer to slides during my talk here
and I'm going to try to keep things relatively simple and a little
more freeform.
Let me just go over briefly what my goals will be in my
discussion today. I'd like to give the audience an overview of
what smart contracts are and why lawyers and law students
might care about them. I have a secondary underhanded goal,
which is to instill a little bit of skepticism in these topics.
There's a lot of boosterism in this space and the boosterism
can lead to a lack of clarity around some topics. I'd like to
encourage everyone in the audience today to take this discus-
sion as a series of hooks into this topic. Almost everything I say
is going to refer to a bunch of other topics. As you've heard
from the presenters up to this point, there's really no such
thing as an isolated topic in this space. You quickly get into,
what are the technical backgrounds behind what we're talking
about? What are the legal connections? What are the business
and governance issues around these things? For all these top-
ics, it's definitely has gotten to the point where it's an ir-
reducibly complex area. My hope would be that we can just
very simply go through some of these topics. Of course, any
real questions that remain bring to the breakout sessions after-
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